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Abstract
This paper explores the impact of corporate governance on the demand for intermediated debt
(asset finance, bank debt, non-bank private debt) and non-intermediated debt (public debt) in
the Australian debt market. Relative to other countries the Australian debt market is
characterised by higher proportions of intermediated or private debt with a lower inherent
level of information asymmetry in that private lenders have greater access to financial
information (Gray, Koh & Tong 2009). Our firm level, cross-sectional evidence suggests that
higher corporate governance impacts demand for debt via the mitigation of default risk.
However, this relationship is not uniform across all debt types. Intermediated debt such as
bank and asset finance debt are more responsive to changes in governance-default risk
relationship than non-bank and non-intermediated debt. The implication is that a firm’s
demand for different debt types will reflect its governance-default risk profile.
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Introduction
We examine the impact of the corporate governance-default risk relationship on the demand
for intermediated and non-intermediated debt in Australia. There is a relatively new but
growing literature that links corporate governance, accounting information and debt
contracting (Armstrong, Guay & Weber 2010). However, most of this research is United
States (US) centric and has largely focused on the drivers of non-intermediated (public) debt
pricing (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & LaFond 2006; Bhojraj
& Sengupta 2003; Mansi, Maxwell & Miller 2004; Sengupta 1998). In contrast, the
Australian corporate debt market is dominated by intermediated or private debt, with
relatively low levels of non-intermediated debt (Reserve Bank of Australia 2005). More
importantly, the Australian debt market arguably has lower inherent information asymmetry,
relative to other countries, due to the continuous disclosure regulations which ensure private
lenders have greater access to financial information (Gray et al. 2009). Despite this unique
market characteristic, recent research finds good accruals quality reduces the cost of debt
(Aldamen & Duncan 2011b; Gray et al. 2009) but governance and default risk only impact
the cost of non-intermediated (not intermediated) debt (Aldamen & Duncan 2011a). However,
as Armstrong et al.’s, (2010) review notes, to date the literature has generally ignored the
relationship between other debt contracting parameters, such as the demand for different
types of debt, and the firm’s corporate governance and accounting information characteristics.
We address this gap in the literature and build on the work of Aldamen and Duncan (2011a)
to explore the impact of different corporate governance-default risk relationships on the
demand for different types of debt.
Wang and Lin (2010) find that default risk reduces significantly as the number of
corporate governance provisions adopted increases. Furthermore, Armstrong et al.’s, (2010)
review suggests that different segments in the debt market (i.e. debt types and lenders in each
category) have different corporate governance-default risk preferences and that this
heterogeneity is a function of firms’ economic characteristics. Firms will demand more of the
debt type that matches their extant governance-default risk characteristics. In our analysis we
focus on the relative levels of each debt type across firms, rather than capital structure
questions that are dealt with extensively elsewhere, and distinguish between two broad debt
types, intermediated and non-intermediated debt (Cantillo &and Wright 2000; Denis &
Mihov 2003). The greater monitoring information available to Australian intermediated debt
providers potentially reduces the default risk mitigating effect of good corporate governance
and differentially impacts the demand for intermediated versus non-intermediated debt
relative to debt providers in other countries.
One of the core differences between intermediated and non-intermediated debt is the
role of the intermediary versus the market. Intermediated debt requires a third party
intermediary to facilitate the debt contracting process between lenders and borrowers
(Warner 1989) and the main types of intermediated debt in Australia are asset finance debt,
bank debt and non-bank debt (Aldamen & Duncan 2011a). Asset finance debt includes
finance leases and hire purchase finance. Bank debt is composed of bank loans, facilities and
overdrafts, while non-bank debt includes loans from non-bank financial institutions, directors
and related entities. Non-intermediated debt includes publicly traded debt instruments that are
issued directly to lenders without intermediation, such as corporate bonds and other
placements such as convertible and non-convertible commercial papers and notes.
For intermediated debt the intermediary performs much of the market’s role (for nonintermediated debt) and assesses and monitors the borrower’s risk and determines the
optimum contracting terms (Diamond 1984). Given the supervisory role of the intermediary,
intermediated debt is also referred to as highly monitored debt (Majumdar & Sen 2006, 2007;
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Rauh & Sufi 2008). Monitoring by the intermediary provides an alternative form of control
and thus mitigates the demand for formal corporate governance mechanisms such as those
recommended by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) (Armstrong et al. 2010; Berger
& Udell 2002; Bhattacharya & Chiesa 1995; Diamond 1984; Fama 1985; James 1987; Leland
& Pyle 1977). It is, however, an empirical question whether or not lower demand for
monitoring translates to lower governance in place for companies with high levels of
intermediated debt. In contrast, non-intermediated debt is characterised by a lower
monitoring intensity, reflective of the borrower’s lower risk position (Cantillo & Wright 2000;
Denis & Mihov 2003; Diamond,1991). Lower monitoring, however, could in turn result in
increased information asymmetry between the debt contracting parties, adversely impacting
demand for non-intermediated debt. We propose that higher levels of corporate governance
mitigate this effect and positively impact demand for non-intermediated debt.
The research question we pose is whether in Australia’s debt market, a unique
monitoring environment dominated by intermediated debt, the nature of the governancedefault risk relationship differentially impacts the demand for intermediated and nonintermediated debt. We address this question and extend the predominantly US empirical
evidence on the drivers of demand for different debt types in a market dominated by
intermediated debt. While there are many debt demand drivers, we draw on the work of
Aldamen and Duncan (2011a) and explore the role of corporate governance and default risk
as the two primary drivers. We contribute to the literature by modelling a two stage process
whereby governance mitigates default risk and this modified risk drives demand for four
intermediated and non-intermediated debt types. Our methodology explicitly recognises
potential endogeneity issues and estimates a system of equations by identifying the correct
channel of governance and risk in the demand for intermediated and non-intermediated debt.3
Thus our evidence is more robust than much of the prior work. We also contribute to the
literature by examining the governance-default risk relation in a market that is systematically
different to the prior US centric literature.
We examine the relative proportion of each type of debt contracted by 595 nonfinancial Australian companies. The analysis finds that companies with higher levels of
corporate governance have lower levels of default risk. We use the predicted default risk
score from our stage one analysis in subsequent analysis and find that estimated default risk
is negatively related to the demand for all debt types: asset finance, bank debt, non-bank debt
and non-intermediated debt, albeit that the relationship between default risk and nonintermediated debt is insignificant. Our cross-sectional evidence suggests that higher
corporate governance impacts demand for debt via the mitigation of default risk. Although
this relationship is uniformly positive, the magnitude of the impact is not uniform across all
debt types. Bank and asset finance debt are more responsive to changes in risk levels than
non-bank and non-intermediated debt. As risk increases the level of bank debt and asset
finance that companies can contract decreases at a faster rate than for non-bank and nonintermediated debt. Our evidence suggests that while all debt categories are responsive to the
governance-default risk characteristics of the firm, a firm with higher default risk is more
likely to obtain debt from non-banking institutions or non-intermediated providers.
Traditional debt providers, banks and asset finance lenders, are more risk averse, as one
would expect, than the less constrained non-bank debt providers. Hence they are more
responsive to the governance-default risk relation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews prior
literature and distils the key theoretical relationships between corporate governance, default
3

Endogeneity issues plague much of the governance (see Brown et al. 2011 for a review) and more generally
accounting (see Larcker & Rusticus 2010)for a review) and finance (see Bhagat & Bolton 2008).

27

AABFJ | Volume 6, no. 3, 2012

risk and demand for the different debt types. The third section develops the analytical models
tested in the study. The fourth section describes the research design which includes the
sample, variables and the empirical methods. The fifth section presents the estimation of the
models and results discussion. The final section offers a summary and conclusion to the paper.
Literature Review
It is well established in the literature that default risk is a significant driver of debt contracting
outcomes (Anderson et al. 2004; Byun 2007; Denis & Mihov 2003; Klock, Mansi & Maxwell
2005). However, it is less clear how corporate governance will impact this relationship and
the demand for different types of debt, although there is some evidence to suggest
governance reduces default risk (Wang & Lin 2010) and hence increases the demand for less
risk-sensitive debt.4 To develop our core proposition we briefly review the prior studies that
link default risk and access to debt and then examine how corporate governance influences
the drivers of default risk thereby influencing demand for debt. Grenadier (1996) finds that
higher levels of default risk impact negatively on secured debt types such as finance lease
contracts. Smith (1987) suggests that firms with high default risk encounter difficulties in
obtaining bank debt. Furthermore, companies that have low default risk, are larger, older and
more successful, tend to demand non-intermediated debt such as corporate bonds and notes
(Cantillo & Wright 2000; Denis & Mihov 2003; Diamond 1991). Collectively the evidence
suggests that higher levels of default risk restrict demand for all four debt types.
A reduction in risk can be achieved by targeting the drivers of that risk. One of the
significant determinants of default risk is the company’s cash flow uncertainty (Aziz,
Emanuel & Lawson 1988; Gentry, Newbold & Whitford 1985; Scott 1981; Trueman &
Titman 1988). Prior research finds a negative relationship between cash flow uncertainty and
default risk (Zeitun, Tian & Kean 2007). Minton and Schrand (1999) show that cash flow
fluctuations defer capital expenditures and delay debt repayments thereby increasing default
risk. The underlying theory is that agency conflicts between managers and stakeholders
increase the variance in expected cash flows thereby increasing default risk (AshbaughSkaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003). Managers that are focused on advancing their
self-interest are likely to engage in shirking, over-consumption of perquisites, empire
building and unprofitable investments in negative net present value projects (Bhojraj &
Sengupta 2003; Dechow & Sloan 1991; Fan 2004; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Sengupta 1998;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The adverse effects of such self-seeking managerial behaviour
reduces the firm’s expected cash flows and increases default risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.
2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003; Jensen & Meckling1976; Sengupta 1998).
It is recognised in the literature and embodied in regulatory provisions worldwide that
implementing good corporate governance practices mitigates the agency costs of self-serving
managers (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003). We define corporate
governance as the methods employed by the owners via the board of directors to mitigate the
debt agency conflict and to align the interests of managers and owners with those of the
debtholders. Good corporate governance consists of many systems and process that elevate
the monitoring and control functions in the firm thereby reducing default risk (AshbaughSkaife et al. 2006; Byun 2007). Corporate governance practices also enhance the disclosure
of quality financial information, thereby bridging the information gap between stakeholders
(Armstrong et al. 2010; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Beekes & Brown 2006; Bhojraj &
Sengupta 2003; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004; Sengupta 1998). Higher levels of
corporate governance mitigate agency conflicts and reduce information asymmetry between
4

See Aldamen et al. (2010) for a discussion on the drivers of default risk.
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managers and investors, thereby impacting variances in expected cash flows and lowering
default risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Schultz, Tan & Walsh 2011; Wang & Lin 2010).
As a result, higher levels of corporate governance are expected to increase demand for all
types of debt.
A more sophisticated proposition is that corporate governance has a differential
impact on demand for debt and depends on the degree to which governance mitigates default
risk in relation to each type of debt: intermediated versus non-intermediated. In particular,
given the differences in monitoring environment there is an argument that the expected
impact of corporate governance on non-intermediated debt will be different to the more
highly monitored intermediated debt. Uppal (2007) finds that extensive disclosure
requirements and better governance are associated with larger bond markets (greater demand
for non-intermediated debt). At the other end of the spectrum, demand for asset finance debt
is not expected to increase in the presence of higher levels of corporate governance because
asset finance providers’ capital is secured with assets pledged by borrowers (Grenadier,
1996). As a result of this collateralised debt agreement, the monitoring and informational
advantages associated with implementing corporate governance practices are less likely to be
a factor in asset finance lending decisions. However, the evidence suggests otherwise with
Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008) finding that higher levels of corporate governance
increases the demand for lease financing. This evidence discounts the differential corporate
governance argument and instead suggests an alternative proposition that corporate
governance has a positive influence on demand for all debt types via default risk mitigation.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this conflicting expectation within the
Australian debt market.
Analytical Model
We theorise that higher levels of corporate governance increase demand for all debt types by
reducing managerial opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry thus reducing
default risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Byun, 2007). That is, corporate governance
systems and processes impact default risk (Wang and Lin, 2010) and this in turn impacts
demand for different debt types as follows:
(1)
(2)
where, default risk,
, corresponds to the default risk measure for firm i in the
represents the corporate governance signal j corresponding to
sample and
the firm i in the sample. In equation (2)
refers to the debt portfolio j corresponding to
the respective firm i in the sample and includes both intermediated and non-intermediated
types of debt. The alternative types of debt we examine are asset finance debt (ASFIN), bank
debt (BANK), non-bank debt (NBANK) and non-intermediated debt (NONINT). Expanding
equation (1) and (2) a simple simultaneous model of governance, risk and debt demand can
be produced as follows:
(3)
(4)
where, αs measure the impact of a vector of corporate governance systems and
processes on the firm’s default risk. Similarly the βs measure the structural effects of
corresponding risk variables to the relative debt type while controlling for other
variables,
, including collateral in place, age and size of the firms. Finally υ and
ε are the error terms for equations (3) and (4) respectively. We derive a reduced form debt
model by substituting
from equation (3) into equation (4). Therefore,
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5
collecting terms
6
giving
7
where, s are the reduced coefficients measuring the effect of corporate governance
on demand for the j different debt types. Equation (7) is the reduced equation in implied nonlinear form which models debt demand for each type as a function of governance
characteristics and controls. In order to estimate the structural parameters we adopt a two
stage method of estimation. In stage one, we estimate the corporate governance and risk
for default risk
in
model shown by equation (3) and substitute the estimated
equation (4) in stage two. Thus the estimable equations can be reproduced as in the following
equations 3 and 4 .
(3 )
(4 )
The dependant variable,
, in equation 4 represents either a categorical variable
for intermediated versus non-intermediated debt (CHOICE) or the demand for each of the
four debt types: asset finance debt (ASFIN), bank debt (BANK), non-bank debt (NBANK) and
non-intermediated debt (NONINT). In stage two of the analysis we examine whether
estimated default risk,
from stage one, is related to the demand for different debt
types via individual models for each debt type (ie equations 4 a, 4 b, 4 c and 4 d below).
(4 a)
(4 b)
(4 c)
(4 d)
Finally, we estimate these equations as a system of equations and impose cross
equation constraints to test the relative magnitude of the risk impacts for each debt type.
Data and Variables
The sample consists of public companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 2007,
the last available year prior to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 – 2009. Only one year’s
worth of data is used because corporate governance characteristics tend to be sticky and not
change very quickly over time (Black, Jang & Kim 2006; Brown, Beekes & Verhoeven 2011).
The initial sample frame which includes 1,824 listed companies is reduced to 595 companies
after applying data and sample constraints.5 The data is collected from annual reports and
database information from AspectHuntley’s DatAnalysis and FinAnalysis and Thomson
Reuters Tick History (TRTH).
Debt Types
Demand for the different debt types is measured by the company’s relative ability to contract
intermediated or non-intermediated debt. At an aggregate level, this is captured as a binary
5

The sample was reduced by the following restrictions: (1) 257 companies from the banking, insurance and
financial sectors are excluded; (2) 328 companies without a 30 June balance date are excluded; (3) 618
companies without interest bearing debt are excluded; (4) 16 companies did not report cost of debt in their
annual reports; (5) 10 outliers were omitted( see McDonald 1973; Subramanyam 1996).
30

Aldamen, Duncan & Khan: Governance-Default Risk Relationship

variable, CHOICE ,which is one if more than 50% of the company’s debt financing is nonintermediated debt and zero otherwise. CHOICE therefore represents those firms with the
majority of their debt being non-intermediated debt. To capture the richness in the data, debt
types are separated into demand for asset finance debt (ASFIN), bank debt (BANK), non-bank
debt (NBANK) and non-intermediated debt (NONINT). Demand for the different debt types
are measured as the proportion of each debt type relative to the total interest bearing debt for
the firm (Bougheas, Mizen & Yalcin 2006; Cantillo & Wright 2000; Denis & Mihov 2003;
González, Lopez & Saurina 2007) as defined below:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
where,
corresponds to asset finance debt for firm i which includes hire
purchase and finance lease liabilities,
refers to bank debt for firm i which includes
bank loans, facilities, and overdraft, and
denotes non-bank debt for firm i which
includes loans made by non-bank financial institutions. Similarly,
is nonintermediated debt for firm i which includes commercial papers, notes, and bonds and finally
is the total interest bearing debt for firm i.
Default Risk
We employ an accounting-based measure of default risk for several reasons. Firstly, the study
is motivated by Armstrong et al.’s (2010) call for further investigation of the relationship
between accounting information and debt contracting. Secondly, there is an extensive body of
accounting literature that links the quality of a firm’s governance ‘mosaic’ (board, audit
committee, internal auditor, external auditor and management characteristics) and financial
reporting quality (Cohen et al. 2004). The quality of a firm’s accounting information is the
link between its level of corporate governance, default risk and type of debt demanded which
is captured by our accounting ratio based default risk measure. Finally, while there are
alternative market risk measures such as bond ratings (for non-intermediated debt), share
price changes and recent multi-factor models (Schultz et al. 2011; Wu et al. 2010), our focus
is on governance-enhanced accounting information and hence we use an accounting based
risk measure rather than the most comprehensive or predictive default model per se.
Default risk, DRISK, is measured via an accounting ratio based out-of-sample
Australian Z-score model identified using multivariate linear discriminant (MLD) consistent
with extensive prior literature (Altman, 1968, 1983). A paired sample of failed and non-failed
Australian companies that are similar in size, industry and time period are employed to
estimate a five factor accounting ratio model. The five accounting ratios are working capital
to total assets (WORKCAP), retained earnings to total assets (RETEARN), earnings before
interest and tax to total assets (ROA), book value of total debt to total assets (LEVERAGE)
and sales to total assets (ASSTURN).6 The estimated DRISK captures both the profitability
(via retained earnings, return on assets and turnover) and financial risk (via leverage and
working capital) dimensions of each firm. Hence we do not include additional controls for
profitability or financial risk in the analysis.7 To enhance clarity, the estimated DRISK is
6

The estimated Z-score model is
1.09
2.91

7

0.38

0.16

2.05

3.06

.
Although the other controls include a collateral variable this is not significantly correlated with leverage.
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multiplied by negative one. The transformed DRISK ranges from -3.73 to 4.58 with a high
DRISK representing high default risk and a low or negative score representing low default
risk.
Corporate Governance
To capture the multi-faceted nature of the corporate governance construct we draw on
fourteen individual governance variables identified in the prior literature and shown in Table
1 (Aldamen & Duncan 2011a; Ang, Cole & Wuh Lin 2000; Daily & Dalton 1994; Davidson,
Bouresli & Singh 2006; Fama & Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Kent & Stewart 2008). The
governance measures include board independence, duality of the role of board chair and chief
executive officer, board size, board meeting, the presence of a nomination committee, the
presence of a remuneration committee, audit committee independence, financial expertise of
the audit committee, audit committee meetings, size of audit committee, audit committee
charter, identity of external auditor, blockholders and insider ownership.
One of the issues facing governance researchers is the dimensionality of the corporate
governance construct (Brown et al. 2011). We follow the approach by Larcker, Richardson
and Tuna (2007) and Aldamen and Duncan (2011a) and utilise principal component analysis
(PCA) to compute two corporate governance factors which summarise the fourteen individual
corporate governance variables. Eleven variables are included in PCA but three variables are
excluded due to low sampling adequacy and Eigen values that are below 1. The eleven
variables show a Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) score of approximately 0.5. The overall
sampling adequacy measure KMO is 0.856 and the Bartlett’s test of Sphericity is significant
at one percent level of significance indicating that the model is appropriate for PCA.
Furthermore, the rotation sums of square loading shows that two factors are extracted and
they explain 65 percent of variance in the corporate governance variables. Table 1 reports the
respective factor loading for each corporate governance variable. The two factors, labelled
GOV1 and GOV2, are employed as the governance proxy measures in all subsequent analysis.
GOV1 captures the audit committee and board oversight (remuneration and nomination
committee) components of the corporate governance for the firm. While GOV2 captures the
size related elements of governance, namely board size and independence and frequency of
hiring a Big4 auditor. The audit-oversight and size governance dimensions are consistent
with the first two factors of Aldamen and Duncan (2011a, 2011b) and are key aspects of the
governance ‘mosaic’ identified in much of the prior accounting governance, debt contracting
and financial reporting literature (Armstrong et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2004).
Controls
We also employ the typical controls for company age, collateral and size.8 Company age,
AGE, a proxy for reputation, is defined as the number of years since incorporation (Diamond,
1989; Pittman and Fortin, 2004). We expect AGE to be negatively related to the level of asset
finance but positively related to other debt types. Young firms will have a higher proportion
of leased assets relative to older more established firms that can use one or more of the other
debt types. We also employ a control for collateral. Asset collateral provides the borrower
with greater access to credit markets (Bougheas et al. 2006) and impacts perceived risk and
Profitability and leverage are also considered significant drivers of cost of debt. However, ZSCORE, measured
as a composition of different accounting ratios, includes return on assets which is a common profitability
measure and debt to asset which is a leverage measure. As a result, the study does not include separate
profitability and leverage control variables.
8
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thus should be positively related to debt type demanded. In accordance with prior research,
we measure collateral, COLLT, as property plant and equipment divided by total assets
(Berger, Ofek & Yermack 1997; Wen, Rwegasira & Bilderbeek 2002). As well as being a
standard control, company size is an important factor which influences the relationship
between corporate governance practices and demand for all debt types (Brewer 2007;
Cantillo & Wright, 2000; Minton & Schrand 1999). We measure company size, SIZE, as the
log of total assets (Pittman & Fortin 2004; Sengupta 1998) which is expected to be positively
related to debt types.
Table 1
Corporate Governance Variables and Rotated Component Matrix
Variable
Name
INDP
DUAL
BDSIZE
BDMEET
NOM
REM
AUDCHRT
AUDIND
AUDEXP
AUDSIZE
AUDMEET
AUDITOR
BLOCK

Principal Components
Variable Description

GOV1

Proportion of non-executive independent
directors on the board.
One if the CEO is separate from chair of the
board, and zero otherwise.
Number of directors on the board.
Number of board meetings.
One if the company has a nomination
committee, and zero otherwise.
One if company has a remuneration
committee, and zero otherwise.
One if the company has an audit committee
charter, and zero otherwise.
Proportion of non-executive independent
members on the audit committee.
Proportion of audit committee members
with accounting and finance qualifications.
Number of directors on audit committee.
Number of audit committee meetings.
One if the auditor is a Big Four, and zero
otherwise.
Percentage of shares owned by investors
owning 5 percent or more of the company’s
shares.

GOV2
0.723

0.787
0.575
0.537
0.693
0.658
0.640
0.549
0.634
0.600
0.675

Percentage of company’s shares owned by
insiders.
Note: PCA procedure: Varimax Rotation with Kaiser Normalization
Three variables, DUAL, BLOCK and INSIDER were dropped from the Principle
Components Analysis.
INSIDER

Estimation and Result Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports the aggregate levels for each debt type (i.e. asset finance, bank debt, non-bank
debt and non-intermediated debt). The aggregate debt types are further broken into short-term
and long-term debt where the former comprises 21% of total interest bearing debt while the
latter makes up 79%. Additionally, non-intermediated debt, which includes convertible and
non-convertible notes, bonds and commercial paper, comprises the largest debt type in terms
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of aggregate value at $54.2 billion or 43.3% of total interest bearing debt. Bank debt which
includes bank loans, facilities and overdrafts totals $42.4 billion or 33.9% of the total interest
bearing debt thereby making it the second largest type of debt. Non-bank debt which includes
loans from non-bank financial institutions, directors and related entities is the third largest
debt type at $24.2 billion or 19.3% of total interest bearing debt. Finally, asset finance which
is represented by finance lease and hire purchases amounts to $4.3 billion or 3.4% of total
interest bearing debt making it the smallest debt type relative to the other types of debt.
However these aggregate dollar levels are distorted by firm size and can be misleading.
Hence we measure the demand for the different debt types as the proportion of each debt type
relative to the total interest bearing debt for the firm. Thus our analysis is based on the
relative demand for each type of debt in a firm’s debt funding mix rather than the dollar value
per se. This allows us to compare the cross-sectional association between relative debt levels
and the governance-default risk driver.
Table 2
Breakdown of Interest Bearing Debt by Type and Term
Type

(Billions)

% of Total

Short Term Debt
$1.0
0.8
(i) Asset finance
16.4
13.1
(ii) Bank
3.4
2.7
(iii) Non-bank
4.7
5.9
(iv) Non-intermediated
26.7
21.3
Total
Long Term Debt
3.3
2.6
(i) Asset finance
26.0
20.8
(ii) Bank
20.8
16.6
(iii) Non-bank
38.6
48.3
(iv) Non-intermediated
78.7
98.4
Total
$125.1
100.0
Total Interest Bearing Debt
Note: N=595 firms. The largest 20 companies account for $47.8 billion of the total nonintermediated (88% of the total $54.2 billion in non-intermediated debt).

The binary variable CHOICE represents the aggregate demand for non-intermediated
versus intermediated debt and equals one if the majority of the company’s debt is nonintermediated and zero otherwise. The results reported in Table 3 show 116 companies have a
majority of non-intermediated debt. Demand for the different debt types is further examined
by the use of four variables which represent the proportion of each debt type relative to the
total interest bearing debt as presented in Table 3. The dominant type of debt accessed is
BANK, with a mean of 33% across the sample. The mean proportion of total interest bearing
is similar across the other three debt types: ASFIN, NBANK and NONINT. However the mix
of debt varies across companies as indicated by the wide range for each type of debt with
different companies having between zero to one hundred percent of each kind of interest
bearing debt. That is, some companies have only ASFIN or only NONINT and so on while
other companies have more of a mix. The median levels also imply most companies have
some form of BANK debt.
Descriptive statistics for DRISK and the controls are also reported in Table 3. The
mean for default risk, DRISK, is 0.49 and ranges from -3.73 to 4.58. AGE ranges between 1
and 124 years with an average of 19.98 years. The collateral control, COLLT, has a mean of
0.33 and ranges between zero and 1.18. The average SIZE is 7.78 which equates to assets of
about $60 million.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Variables
ASFIN
BANK
NBANK
NONINT1
CHOICE 2
DRISK
AGE
COLLT
SIZE

Mean
0.27
0.33
0.19
0.20
0.20
0.49
19.98
0.33
7.78

Median
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.75
15.00
0.26
7.67

Standard Deviation
0.40
0.41
0.35
0.35
0.40
1.46
18.33
0.29
0.93

Minimum
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-3.73
1.00
0.00
5.71

Maximum
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.58
124.00
1.18
10.87

Note: N: 595
1
183 companies have some non-intermediated debt in their finance mix which represents 31% of the
total sample. Of these 38 or 6.4% of the sample have only non-intermediated debt.
2
CHOICE equals 1 if the majority of the company’s debt is non-intermediated and zero otherwise. 116
companies have a majority non-intermediated debt.

Corporate Governance and Default Risk
Stage one of the analysis tests whether corporate governance is related to default risk. The
results presented in Table 4 indicate that GOV1 (audit and board oversight governance) and
GOV2 (size related governance such as board size, independence and Big4 auditor) are
negatively related to DRISK at the 1% significance level. This implies that an increase in both
audit-oversight and size aspects of corporate governance results in a decrease in default risk
as expected. Similar results are reported by Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Wang and Lin
(2010) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) who also find that corporate governance decreases
default risk. We save the estimated values for default risk,
, and use them in the next
phase of the analysis.
Default Risk and Demand for Debt Types
Stage two of the analysis examines whether estimated default risk,
, is related to the
demand for different debt types. We estimate equations (4′a through d) for the four debt
types. The results shown in Table 4 suggest that ASFIN is negatively related to
at the
5% significance level. This indicates that a decrease in
results in an increase in
ASFIN. Additionally, AGE and SIZE are negatively related to ASFIN at the 1% significance
level which indicates that the demand for asset secured finance such as lease liabilities and
hire purchase decreases with an increase in company age and size. For BANK, the
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Demand for
bank debt therefore increases when estimated default risk decreases. Additionally, SIZE is
positively related to BANK which indicates that demand for bank debt increases as companies
become larger. The results in Table 4 suggest that NBANK and
are negatively related
at the 10% significance level. This further supports the overall negative relationship between
estimated default risk and demand for all intermediated debt types. Finally the relationship
between NONINT and
is negative, but unlike the previous default risk-debt type
relationships, it is not statistically significant. The final model relates the choice of
intermediated versus non-intermediated debt to the debt choice drivers
, age, collateral
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and size. The results show that a significantly negative relationship between debt type,
CHOICE, and estimated default risk. The significant negative coefficient means that
companies with higher estimated default risk are more likely to choose intermediated debt.
This implies that the proportion of intermediated debt is more sensitive to the governancedefault risk relation,
, than is the case for non-intermediated debt.
Table 4
Corporate Governance, Default Risk and Demand for Debt Types
STAGE ONE (Equation 3/)

STAGE TWO (Equation 4/)

DRISK

ASFIN

BANK

NBANK

NONINT

CHOICEv

Intercept

4.269***
(0.00)

1.359***
(0.00)

-0.423***
(0.00)

0.183
(0.30)

-0.089
(0.79)

0.043
(0.16)

GOV1

-0.216***
(0.00)

GOV2

-0.171***
(0.01)
-0.084**
(0.03)

-0.076**
(0.04)

-0.05*
(0.10)

-0.104
(0.16)

-0.026**
(0.01)

-0.002***
(0.00)

0.001
(0.40)

0.002**
(0.04)

0.001
(0.84)

-0.001***
(0.00)

0.070
(0.21)

-0.042
(0.49)

0.080
(0.25)

-0.026
(0.74)

0.04*
(0.06)

-0.129***
(0.00)

0.101***
(0.00)

-0.005
(0.83)

0.041
(0.31)

0.02**
(0.02)

AGE
COLLT
SIZE
Adj. R-Squared
F-statistic
Obs*R2

0.21

0.08

0.08

0.04

0.06

0.09

33.17***
(0.00)

14.09***
(0.00)

11.84***
(0.00)

2.684**
(0.03)

12.01***
(0.00)

2.48**
(0.04)

0.32
(0.85)

0.05
(0.82)

2.12
(0.15)

6.60
(0.16)

2.87
(0.57)

16.22
(0.30)

Notes:
i. Stage One refers to the corporate governance and default risk model corresponding to equation
(3/).
ii. Stage Two presents estimates of default risk (estimated) and debt type model equation (4/a-d) plus
a fifth model where the dependant variable is the binary CHOICE variable (see vi below).
iii. The corporate governance components have been reduced to two factors using principal
component method. These reduced factors satisfy all necessary properties before to be utilized in
the stage one estimates.
iv. ***, ** and * respectively significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% level of significance. P-values are
presented in brackets.
v. We pass these estimates through the battery of different statistical tests including F-statistics
showing overall significance of the coefficients corresponding to each model estimated in the
above. Further we take care of heteroskedasticity the potential problem in cross-sectional
estimations. White hetroskedasticity test and Breusch-Pagan Godfrey Tests produce the consistent
results and do not allow to reject the null hypothesis of no hetroskedasticity shown as Obs*R2
vi. CHOICE is a binary variable defined as one if the company has more than 50% of its financing
mix from non-intermediate debt and zero otherwise. 116 or 19.5% of the companies in the sample
have more than 50% non-intermediated debt.
36

Aldamen, Duncan & Khan: Governance-Default Risk Relationship

To more fully explore the implications of this result we re-estimate the stage two
system of equations with cross equation restrictions to test the hypothesis that the coefficient
for
is equal for all debt types. The results reported in Table 5 show that all risk
coefficients corresponding to ASFIN, BANK, NBANK and NONINT are significantly different
from each other. To determine the relative impact of governance-default risk across the debt
types we impose pairwise restrictions on the cross equation
coefficients. The results
in Table 5 show that 1 and 1 are not different from each other suggesting governancedefault risk has a similar impact on the demand for both ASFIN and BANK debt. We also find
that parameters  1 and 1 are not significantly different which implies the demand for nonbank debt, NBANK, and non-intermediated debt, NONINT, have a similar responsiveness to
the governance-default risk relation.
We also find that the estimated coefficient 1 is significantly larger than both  1 and 1
which means that the level of asset finance, ASFIN, is more responsive to increases in
governance-default risk than both NBANK and NONINT. Similarly the coefficient for 1 is
significantly larger than both  1 and 1 . The statistical results in Table 5 suggest the following
relationship between the parameters: 1  1   1  1 . In total these results imply that there is
a cascading effect of governance-default risk across the debt types. The governance-default
risk relation has a larger impact on the proportion of ASFIN and BANK relative to NBANK
and NONINT debt. The evidence from the restricted estimation is consistent with the
CHOICE model and suggests that a higher governance-default risk relation has more of an
impact on the proportion of ASFIN, BANK and NBANK debt relative to NONINT. Overall
these results are consistent with governance mitigating accounting based measure of default
risk and the resultant risk negatively impacting debt levels, more so for asset finance and
bank debt than non-bank and non-intermediated debt. Hence we can conclude that
governance positively impacts asset and bank debt more than non-bank and nonintermediated debt.
Table 5
Cross Equation Restrictions to Test Differential Impact of Governance-Default Risk on Debt Type
Demanded

 2  Test

Coefficient Hypothesis

( P  value)

H 0 : 1  1   1  1

64.31
(000)

H1 : 1  1   1  1
H 0 : 1  1
H1 : 1  1
H 0 :  1  1
H1 :  1  1
H 0 : 1   1
H 1 : 1   1
H 0 : 1  1
H1 : 1  1

Decision
Reject H 0

0.0002
(0.985)

Fail to reject

0.268
(0.604)

Fail to reject

29.10
(0.000)

Reject

H0

34.30
(0.000)

Reject

H0

H0
H0
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Comments
All risk coefficients 1 , 1 ,  1 and 1
corresponding to ASFIN, BANK, NBANK
and NONINT are different from each other.

1 and 1 are not statistically different
from each other.
 1 and1 are not statistically different
from each other.

1 and  1 are different from each other
and 1 is relatively greater than  1 .
1 and 1 are different from each other
and 1 is relatively greater than  1 .
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H 0 : 1   1
H1 : 1   1
H 0 : 1  1
H1 : 1  1

29.93
(0.000)

Reject

H0

35.05
(0.000)

Reject

H0

1 and  1 are different from each other
and 1 is relatively greater than  1 .
1 and1 are different from each other and
1 is relatively greater than  1 .

Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance, via default risk
mitigation, on the demand for different debt types in Australia. Companies choose between
intermediated debt, such as asset finance, bank debt and non-bank debt, and nonintermediated debt. While there are many potential drivers for this choice we explore the role
of governance and default risk, two primary drivers, on the relative proportion of each type of
debt contracted by companies in a two-stage analysis.
The results for stage one show that companies with higher levels of corporate
governance have lower levels of default risk, consistent with the prior evidence (Wang & Lin
2010). We use the predicted default risk from our stage one analysis to examine the
differential demand for four debt types. The results for stage two show that estimated default
risk is negatively related to asset finance, bank debt, non-bank debt and non-intermediated
debt. However, the relationship between default risk and non-intermediated debt is
insignificant. Our cross-sectional evidence suggests that firms with higher levels of corporate
governance also exhibit lower default risk and this is associated with firms demanding higher
levels of all of the intermediated debt types. Similar results are reported by Bougheas et al.
(2006) who conclude that firms with higher default risk contract lower levels of bank debt.
Furthermore, Gonzalez, Lopez and Saurina (2007) find that default risk is negatively related
to the demand for bank debt but the relationship is not statistically significant. In contrast we
find a significant negative relationship with all intermediated debt types.
Regulators can benefit from this analysis as it provides evidence with respect to the
value of corporate governance. Companies that engage in costly governance practices expect
payback benefits including improved financial stability, lower default risk, reduced
information asymmetry, improved information quality and thus improved decision making
(Aldamen, Duncan & McNamara 2010). More specifically one would expect governance to
impact demand for debt over and above other firm specific factors. Our results suggest that
corporate governance impacts access to intermediated and non-intermediated debt for
Australian companies via the mitigation of default risk. However this relationship is not
uniform across debt types. The demand for both bank and asset finance debt is more
responsive to changes in governance-default risk levels than non-bank and non-intermediated
debt. As default risk increases the level of bank debt and asset finance that companies can
contract decreases at a faster rate than for non-bank and non-intermediated debt. So while all
debt categories are responsive to the governance-default risk characteristics of the firm, if a
firm has higher risk it is more likely to obtain debt from non-banking institutions or nonintermediated providers. Traditional debt providers, banks and asset finance lenders, are more
risk averse, as one would expect, than the less constrained non-bank debt providers. Hence
the level of corporate governance potentially has a larger impact on the demand for these
intermediated debt types relative to other types of debt.
We expected that Australia’s intermediated debt market, with its unique continuous
disclosure requirements, might not be as responsive to governance as other markets such as
the US where non-intermediated debt is more prevalent. The increased monitoring by
intermediaries, in the banking sector in particular, serves as an alternative form of control and
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thus mitigates the demand for formal corporate governance mechanisms (Aldamen & Duncan
2011a; Armstrong et al. 2010). The US public debt market, the focus of much prior research,
is likely to be more responsive to governance than the Australian market. However our
findings suggest that higher levels of corporate governance mitigate default risk even in
Australia’s information-rich intermediated debt market. This supports the ASX’s pursuit of
governance best practices within the local market.
Finally our analysis has implications for future research. The differential impact of
governance and default risk on demand for different debt types suggests that researchers need
to control for this non-uniform relationship when examining debt contracting. Researchers
need to control for the co-variation between governance and default risk via instrumental or
two-stage analysis by first modelling the risk drivers then the impact of this relationship on
the focus variables of the research. However, the current cross-sectional study is but one
limited piece of evidence. Future research needs to consider the relationship over time to shed
further light on the causal links between changes in governance and resultant changes in debt
contracting outcomes.
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